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ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

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On March 21, 2006 Christine Fair spoke about her recent trip to Pakistan. Fair's fieldwork was conducted with her Pakistan-based colleague Syed Rashad Bukhari and in collaboration with the National Bureau of Asian Research. Fair and Bukhari spent nearly three weeks visiting administrators at ten of the most prominent post-secondary *madaris* (singular *madrassah*) located in the cities of Lahore, Mardan, Peshawar, Multan and Karachi. They also interviewed senior faculty and personnel at the International Islamic University Islamabad as well as staff at primary Islamic schools and newly established alternative Islamic schools. The team also interviewed government officials and non-governmental analysts.

Through these interviews and visits, Fair and Bukhari aimed to understand Islamic education in Pakistan and the ways in which this educational sector is responding to the various internal and external demands for reform. During her presentation, Fair provided the audience with an extensive background on *madaris* and their students. In the second part of her presentation, she discussed specific views expressed by the different stakeholders interviewed. She concluded with some preliminary implications for the governments of the United States and Pakistan.

I. A PRIMER TO PAKISTAN'S *MADARIS* AND THEIR STUDENTS

Organization

The preponderance of Pakistan's *madaris* is affiliated with one of five Islamic school boards (*Wafaq*). There are three Sunni *madrassah* boards (Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadees, and Barelvi), and one for the Shia and the supra-sectarian Jamaat Islami (JI) *madaris*.

There are several levels of Islamic education available in Pakistan (see Table 1), which is provided by *madaris* as well as primary Islamic schools known as *makatib* (singular *maktab*). Part of the analytical puzzle with enumerating *madaris* and their students has been the persistent problem of distinguishing between *makatib* and *madaris*. The *makatib* tend to be smaller than "*madaris*," have fewer students, are less likely to have hostels and are almost always associated with mosques.¹ Where *madaris* and *makatib* differ most clearly is in their scope of education. *Makatib* teach primary Islamic subjects such as reading the Quran (*Nazira*). Some may also teach *Hifz* (or memorization of

Quran). The *sina qua non* of a *madrassah* is that it teaches—either in full or in part—a specialized curriculum called *Dars-e-Nizami*.ⁱⁱ

Boys typically complete the *Dars-e-Nizami* in 8 years at Sunni *madaris*. Girls complete a condensed curriculum in 6 years. Students complete four successive degrees (*sanad*) at regular intervals. The government of Pakistan (GOP) recognizes the final degree (*Shahadatul Alamiya*) as the equivalent to an MA in Arabic and Islamic studies for most purposes. None of the lower degrees are recognized by the government. Students can take local school board exams and thereby obtain mainstream degrees while studying the *Dars-e-Nizami* curriculum. However, this appears to be feasible only for the most motivated students and is not necessarily typical. Not all *madaris* have faculty that teach at all levels, and thus some students may study at more than one *madrassah* to attain their various degrees. For a schedule of degrees and their comparable attainment in the mainstream educational system, see Table 1.

Table 1. Programs of *Madaris* Study and Their Chronological Equivalency to Non-religious School

Level(Darja)	Level	Duration	Certificate (Sanad)	Comparable to Mainstream Education
Ibtedai	Nazara	4-5 yrs.	Shahadatul Tahfeez ul Quran	Primary (5 th grade)
Mutavasatta	<i>Hifz</i>	3 yrs	Shahadatul Mutavasatta	Middle (8 th)
Sanviya Amma	Tajveed, Qeeraat	2 yrs	Shahadatul Sanviya ul Amma	Matric (10 th)
Sanviya Khasa	Tehtani (Higher secondary)	2 yrs.	Shahadatul Sanviya Khasa	Intermediate (FA)
Aliya	Mohqufaleh Khasa va Sada (College)	2 yrs.	Shahadatul Aliya	BA
Alamiya	Daura Hadees Sabia va Saniya	2 yrs.	Shahadatul Alamiya phil Uloom Arabia vul Islamia	MA and recognized as MA in Arabic and Islamic studies by the Government of Pakistan.

Note: Nazara is the student's first introduction to learning to recite the Quran, *Hifz* is the memorization of the Quran, Tavjeed is another form of recitation of the Quran. Qeeraat is the learning to recite the Quran in all seven modes (ahruf) for such recitation. One who has mastered all is called a Qari. Tehtani simply means. Source: Saleem Mansuur Khaled, *Deeni Madaaris main taaleem*, (Islamabad: IPS, 2002, p. 144), Institute for Policy Studies, *Pakistan Religious Education Institutions an Overview-an IPS Taskforce Report* (Islamabad: IPS, 2002, p. 22).

Dars-e-Nizami covers some 20 subjects which fall into two categories: *al-uloom an-naqliya* (transmitted sciences) and *al-uloom al-aqliya* (rational sciences). Half of the curriculum includes subjects that are strictly religious in nature. The texts used for religious subjects generally date back to the seventh century. The most recent of these were written in the 11th century.

The remaining subjects include medicine, mathematics, astronomy, history, philosophy, prosody, and polemics and were included in the 19th century to both equip the students for civil service jobs and to help them understand religious texts.ⁱⁱⁱ One should not conclude that because these “rational sciences” are included in the curriculum that students are receiving a well-rounded education. First, many *madaris* stopped teaching these subjects. Second, for those that do retain these subjects, the texts that are used to teach these subjects are all classical and date to the 11th and 14th centuries.^{iv}

In addition to the *Dars-e-Nizami* curriculum, some of the more prestigious *madaris* have post graduate specialization programs (e.g. in *Tafseer, Hadees, Iftah, Fiqh*). These high-level programs are only for students who have completed *Dars-e-Nizami* and may take at least two years to complete, depending upon the subject and the desired level of qualification.

Counting Madaris

There have been several important –albeit overlooked—surveys of *madaris* conducted by the GOP, including a report from 1979 done by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and two reports by the Ministry of Education in 1989 and 2000. These reports suggest that as of 2000, there were 6,741 *registered madaris* in Pakistan. Table 2 provides a historical count of *madaris* by geographical distribution.

Table 2. Expansion of Deeni Madaris between 1947 and 2000 by Region

Province/Area	1947	1960	1980	1988	2000
Punjab	121	195	1,012	1,320	3,153
Sarhad (NWFP)	59	87	426	678	1,281
Sindh	21	87	380	291	905
Baluchistan	28	70	135	347	692
Azad Kashmir	4	8	29	76	151
Islamabad	--	1	27	47	94
Northern Areas	12	16	47	102	185
FATA	--	--	--	--	300
Total	245	464	2056	2861	6,741

Source: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1979 Report, Ministry of Education, Islamabad 1988, 2000. Compiled in Saleem Mansoor Khaled, *Deeni Madaris Main Taleem*, p. 145

However, Fair argued that it is nearly impossible to know how many *madaris* there are in Pakistan for at least four reasons. First, many popular media reports likely have conflated *madaris* with *makatib* and may be dramatically overestimating *madaris* numbers. Second, there is no extant central database of registered *madaris*. Registration happens at the district, and those documents are all in hardcopy filed with local governments. Third, it

is highly likely that those records are woefully out of date. Fourth, records are only for *registered madaris*.

How Many Students Attend Madaris?

Tahir Andrabi and colleagues executed the first (and to date only) study that enumerates the market share of *madaris* and other schools through rigorous empirical analysis.^{vi} Andrabi’s team used the 1998 Census of Pakistan^{vii} and three waves of the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (fielded in 1991, 1998, 2001).^{viii} They found that overall, less than 1% of enrolled students attend *madaris* full-time (see Table 3).^{ix} In contrast, nearly 70% attend public schools and 30% attend private schools.

While full-time *madaris* enrollment is relatively low on average, there is geographical variation within Pakistan. Whereas for the bulk of districts in Pakistan, the *madrasah* market share falls between 0.02 and 1 percent of total enrollment, there are also districts with what Andrabi has defined as “extreme” market share (2 percent or higher). The districts with the most extreme *madrasah* enrollments are all in the Pashto-speaking belt—either in Baluchistan or in the NWFP. There are 13 districts where the *madrasah* market share is between 2 and 5 % and in Pishin, the *madrasah* market share is 7%.^x

Table 3. National *Madaris* Enrollment Estimates-By Source and Year

Data Source	<i>Madaris</i> Enrollment	<i>Madaris</i> Students as a Fraction of Total Enrolled Students
Census of Pakistan, 1998		
<i>Total</i>	159,225	0.70%
<i>Male</i>	111,085	0.82%
<i>Female</i>	48,140	0.53%
PIHS 1991	151,546	0.78%
PIHS 1998	178,436	0.74%
PIHS 2001	176,061	0.70%

Source: Andrabi et al, p. 33.

Madaris and Militancy

There are solid reasons to doubt the most sweeping claims that link *madaris* and militancy in Pakistan. This author has conducted considerable research on militancy in Pakistan since 2000 and has found no compelling evidence that militants are overwhelmingly coming from *madaris*.^{xi} Scholars like Mark Sageman, Alan Krueger, Peter Bergen and Claude Berrebi have collected extensive background on Islamist terrorists and found that the vast majority were on average better educated than the

populations from which they came.^{xii} Fair has overseen her own survey of 130 families in Pakistan who have lost at least one son to militancy in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The team collected extensive background information on these militants and found no evidence that *madaris* are a principle place for their recruitment.

Terrorist groups, like other employers, impose standards of quality in their recruitment efforts and will pick the person who is most qualified for the intended mission. Research shows that terrorists tend to be of “higher quality”—more educated or accomplished in other jobs and pursuits. Given the general dearth of secular subjects (math, English, sciences) *madrasah* students (without mainstream education) are not likely to be desirable to many terrorist groups, especially when higher quality recruits are available.^{xiii}

While it is likely that Pakistan’s *madaris* do not contribute significantly to the supply of terrorist manpower, they may foster conditions that are conducive to public support for terrorism. Tariq Rahman has evidence that this is the case. He administered an attitudinal survey to 488 10th-grade students in Urdu medium public schools, English medium private schools, and their equivalent students in *madaris*.^{xiv} He inquired about their views toward open war with India, support for various jihadi groups, and the utility of peaceful means to resolve conflicts. He also asked students whether they favored equal rights for Pakistan’s religious minorities (Ahmediyas, Hindus and Christians) and women.^{xv} Rehman administered a similar survey to the students’ teachers.^{xvi} The aggregate data for questions asked of students and teachers are given in Table 4. His results demonstrate that *madaris* students are consistently more likely to support war with India and the use of militants in Kashmir, and are less likely to support equal rights for Pakistan’s minorities and women. Private school (English medium) students, on the other hand, were more likely to support peaceful outcomes and minority and women’s rights.

Table 5. Student Responses (Teacher Responses Given in Parentheses)

Question: What should be Pakistan's priorities	Percent Responding	<i>Madrassah</i>	Urdu Medium	English Medium
Take Kashmir away from India by an open war	Yes	60 (70)	40 (20)	26 (26)
	No	32 (22)	53 (70)	65 (65)
	DK	8 (7)	7 (10)	9 (9)
Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight the Indian army	Yes	53 (59)	33 (19)	22 (38)
	No	32 (27)	45 (68)	60 (51)
	DK	15 (11)	22 (13)	17 (11)
Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no war or sending jihadi groups across LOC)	Yes	34 (30)	76 (85)	72 (60)
	No	55 (67)	18 (10)	19 (34)
	DK	11 (4)	6 (5)	9 (6)
Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs, etc?	Yes	13 (4)	47 (27)	66 (43)
	No	82 (96)	37 (65)	9 (37)
	DK	5 (NIL)	16 (8)	25 (20)
Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs, etc?	Yes	17 (15)	47 (37)	78 (62)
	No	76 (85)	43 (58)	14 (26)
	DK	7 (NIL)	10.00 (5)	8 (12)
Give equal rights to Pakistani Christian in all jobs, etc?	Yes	18 (19)	66 (52)	84 (82)
	No	73 (78)	27 (42)	9 (11)
	DK	8 (4)	9 (6)	8 (8)
Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?	Yes	17 (4)	75 (61)	91 (78)
	No	77 (97)	17 (33)	6 (14)
	DK	6 (NIL)	7 (6)	3 (8)

Source: Tariq Rahman, 2003, p. 29.

II. NOTES FROM THE FIELD

What the Government Officials Believed

During fieldwork, Fair and Bukhari wanted to understand the drivers of Islamic school reform and to identify the various objectives of the government in Pakistan in pursuing this reform. They met with a several officials at the Council of Islamic Ideology, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education. One high-ranking ministry

official, who typified the views of others interviewed, explained that the GOP wants "*madaris* students to be more employable and socially acceptable."

Several government interlocutors expressed the concern that *madaris* contribute to the pervasive problem of sectarian violence. This impression comports with the empirical evidence marshaled by Saleem Ali, who has shown a statistically significant connection between density of *madaris* and propensity for sectarian violence.^{xvii} A number of officials also expressed concern that the *madrassah* system is fundamentally geared toward producing *ullema* and religious officiates. However, given the medieval curriculum and books used in the *Dars-e-Nizami*, Pakistan's *ullema* are increasingly irrelevant for a modern Muslim state.

In recognition that *madaris* are not the only factor contributing to the problem of sectarian violence, the GOP has initiated several changes in the government school curriculum and concomitant textbooks.^{xviii} However, one prominent non-government analyst believed that while these changes are a step in the right direction, non-Muslim students are still subjected to compulsory Islamic instruction, in violation of their constitutional rights. This analyst is not optimistic that this will change, largely because of the political sensitivities surrounding this issue.

While most persons interviewed were confident that *madrassah* leadership would eventually conform, they acknowledged that *madrassah* reform would be complicated and difficult. (They expressed guarded optimism about curriculum and textbook reform in the mainstream schools). GOP officials noted two sources of opposition within the *madaris* system.

First, many *madrassah* officials and administrators have ties to religious political parties in Pakistan, which means that their actions on this complex and controversial issue may affect their political standing. Consequently, a person may say one thing while dealing with GOP officials and reverse his position when addressing the public. (This gives the impression that Islamists inveterately renege on commitments—even if their "reneging" is only for public consumption, as the GOP seems to believe).

Second, some of the *madaris* are quite lucrative financial enterprises with unaccountable inflows of financial contributions. In many cases, the running of *madaris* is a family affair. *Madrassah* leadership want to protect what has become, in some cases, very profitable businesses.

Views of Non-government Analysts

Various interviewees explained what they believe to be a trend among Pakistani parents, many of whom have come to attach greater prestige to Islamic education. This preference has been increasing over the last 10 to 15 years, and many parents now prefer that at least one child have an Islamic education (e.g. the study of *Hifz-e-Quran*). This view was shared widely by government as well as non-government interlocutors,

including *madaris* administrators, independent analysts, and scholars from the International Islamic University Islamabad.

Non-government analysts expressed concerns that these reforms may backfire because they do not recognize the fundamental aspects of parental choice. These reforms are generated from the top and promulgated downward, reminiscent of the way in which an order is given in the army.^{xix} Critics opine that these decisions do not take into consideration parental choice, student preferences, or a realistic integration with job expansion and economic reform. Several interlocutors explained that Pakistani parents are increasingly dismayed by the government schools, which neither impart quality worldly education *nor* contribute to making their children “good Muslims.” This disconnect between the GOP’s objectives and parents’ preferences has given rise to many new Islamic institutions that seek to combine excellence in worldly subjects with elements of Islamic education.^{xx}

IEWS OF MADRASSAH ADMINISTRATORS

As noted, Fair and Bukhari visited 10 of the most important and high-quality *madaris* in Pakistan. These *madaris* offer the full *Dars-e-Nizami* curriculum and have the luxury of imposing any number of quality-related conditions on enrollment. Thus, readers should be advised that these schools *do not* likely resemble the vast majority of *madaris*.

These interviewees claimed that *madrassah* students (both graduates and drop outs) tend to work for religious parties or in a wide array of religious occupations as maulvis, mullahs, teachers, khateeb, qaris and muazzam. They contended that *madrassah* students are *less* likely to be unemployed than graduates of mainstream schools.^{xxi}

Despite the fact that the interviews were not confidential, *madrassah* administrators (with few exceptions) opined that they had little or no intention of complying with GOP efforts to “interfere.” It was their view that the GOP sought to register and then regulate. (Notably, this view comported with the objectives given by GOP officials.) *Madrassah* administrators believed that GOP efforts to intrude into *madaris* activities were motivated by U.S. and U.K. pressure. Moreover, *madrassah* officials believe that the efforts of the United States and other external actors sought to de-Islamize Pakistan’s religious and mainstream education.

While *madrassah* administrators voiced opposition to GOP efforts, they noted that they have already undertaken various reforms and in some cases these reforms were initiated well before the GOP became interested. This involved introducing modern subjects into the *Dars-e-Nizami* curriculum and requiring that students must complete the 10th (or in some cases the 8th) grade as a precondition for acceptance. Long-time observers of *madaris* note that only the best *madaris* impose this qualification for admission and also note that there are a number of exceptions to this rule. Indeed, visual inspection of the *madaris* suggested to Fair and Bukhari that this was the case.

Madrassah officials argued that since their students tend to be 10th-grade graduates, *madaris* are a specialization program similar to other academic specialization in Pakistan (e.g. medicine, engineering, teaching, etc.).^{xxii} *Madaris* officials often noted that no one asks engineering schools why they are not teaching Islamic studies. So why, they ask, should *madaris* be criticized for not teaching math? The problem with this argument of course is that many analysts doubt that the preponderance of *madaris* take students who have completed the 10th grade.

Fair and Bukhari also found that many of the most important *madaris* had already been registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. In fact, many of the ostensible problems associated with registration appear to be political in nature. *Madaris* administrators found that it greatly helped their efforts to raise funds if they could be registered under this provision, as it conferred a sense of legitimacy to the *madrassah*. However, in the early 1990s, Benazir Bhutto prohibited *madaris* from registering under this act in a doomed effort to slow the growth of *madaris*. In many cases, *madaris* wanted to register but were unable to do so.

Resistance to registration has now centered on the new conditions under the revised Societies Registration Act. *Madrassah* officials must attest that they will not teach sectarian hatred, that they will not support jihad and that they will submit a financial report annually. *Madrassah* officials oppose this language on several grounds, including the suggestion that they were supporting jihad and sectarian violence in the past. (Critics of *madaris* interviewed by Fair and Bukhari note that the *madaris* were able to get a number of concessions that substantially watered down GOP interests and doubt the utility of the exercise under current conditions). *Madaris* officials also felt that it was unfair that they were being asked to register when private schools in Pakistan are not required to do so.

Madrassah officials generally said that they tend to cater to those poorer students who have fewer educational options. (Thus there is a supply-side dimension to parental choice in favor of *madaris*). Many administrators noted that substantial portions (maybe 30%) of their student bodies are from the middle class and that their families can afford other options. This is not discordant with the findings of the World Bank (and published studies by the Institute of Policy Studies^{xxiii}) that also suggest that some children attending *madaris* belong to families that can afford other options. (This suggests a demand-side component in parental selection of *madaris*). In some cases, Fair and Bukhari collected data on financial aid and these data did support this contention.^{xxiv}

Supporting the notion that Islamic education may be partially a demand-side phenomenon is the growth of new forms of schools that combine religious and worldly subjects. Some of these schools are run by the *madaris* themselves as is the case with Kher-ul-*Madaris* in Multan and Jamia Ashrafiya in Lahore. Some of these schools are new ventures and have established numerous chains all over Pakistan (e.g. Iqra Rozatul Itfal, Al Huda, Sufa Education, Hera School and Tameer-e-Millat).

Fair and Bukhari also found that, in some cases, the administrators have no *madrassah* educational background because they inherited this position from their fathers or other relatives. In some cases, their own children do not study at *madaris*; rather, they study in mainstream schools or in the new mainstream schools that are established by the *madaris*.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Fair and Bukhari came to the following tentative conclusions:

- Earlier assertions about the pervasiveness of *madaris* appear to be baseless in light of current and previous research.^{xxv} Moreover, the most robust estimates of *madaris* market share suggest that less than 1 percent of all full-time enrolled students attend *madaris*.^{xxvi}
- There is scant evidence that *madaris* contribute substantially to the recruitment of militants. This is probably because militant organizations have their own quality standards and, given their relatively small recruitment missions, they likely have other options. Similarly, most observers believe that only a very small number of *madaris* are involved in the actual training of militants.
- However, it is likely that *madaris* may contribute to conditions that are conducive to supporting terrorism and militancy. *Madaris* may likely contribute to Pakistan's domestic security challenges and may indirectly pose challenges to regional security as well. In addition, there is evidence that density of *madaris* contribute to sectarian violence. This is probably due, at least in part, to the fact that each school teaches the superiority of its own tradition.
- The *madrassah* system as it is currently constituted, in the views of several interlocutors, is likely producing *ullema* that are irrelevant and ill-prepared to contribute to the needs of a modern Muslim state.
- Given that the vast majority of students attend public schools, it seems that disproportionate efforts have been expended focusing on the *madaris*. It does seem that greater attention should be given to public schools and possibly to encouraging greater access to private schools. Recall from Rehman's study that private school students and teachers were more likely to support equal rights for Pakistan's minorities and women and were more likely to support peaceful means of conflict resolution.
- More attention needs to be spent understanding the determinants of parental choice in educating their children. If GOP efforts do not adequately consider the demands of parents as well as the demands of the labor market and an evolving economy, the market will provide other options to parents.
- Finally, many Pakistanis believe that education reform in Pakistan is driven by external actors (e.g. the United States and Britain) and as such explicitly seek to de-Islamize education in Pakistan. This has contributed to a general dissatisfaction with the school system writ large and the desire to find other alternatives, which as noted, the market is providing. Not all of these options are expensive and poorer students can finance these alternatives through *zakat* (form of Islamic charity).

ⁱ However, not all madaris have hostels and some madaris are also associated with mosques.

ⁱⁱ While this is generally true, many madaris that teach a full-curriculum have satellites that teach only Hifz or Nazira. Fair observed that it is difficult to distinguish these satellites of madaris from makatib.

ⁱⁱⁱ During the Mughal period, the madaris produced jurists, lawyers and other state functionaries for the court. Under various treaties bringing parts of the declining Mughal Empire under the control of the East India Company, the East India Company promised to continue using Islamic institutions for governance such as courts. During this period, madaris were important sites of producing functionaries for these posts. This continued until the Mutiny of 1857 when control of the Subcontinent formally was taken over by the British state.

^{iv} Mumtaz Ahmad, "Madrassah Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh," in Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Malik Eds. *Religious and Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu: APCSS, 2004, pp. 101-115);

^v Tafseer is exegesis of the Quran, Hadees is the study of the texts compiling the life and traditions of the Prophet, Iftah is the study of giving legal opinions (fatwa) and fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence.

^{vi} See Tahir Andrabi et al. *Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, February 8, 2005). Available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=667843 (accessed March 19, 2006).

^{vii} For information about obtaining the respondent-level data or to obtain summary statistics, information about the survey instrument, its sample structure or other such information, see the Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization website at <http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/index.html> (last accessed March 19, 2006).

^{viii} See Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of Statistics website at <http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/> (accessed March 19, 2006).

^{ix} Fair discussed with attendees some of the methodological problems associated with this survey (many of which are discussed by the authors), but ultimately argued for the overall robustness of their findings.

^x See Andrabi et al., Figure 1.b, p. 29.

^{xi} See Christine Fair, "Militant recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations," C. Christine Fair, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 27, No. 6 (November/December 2004) and C. Christine Fair and Husain Haqqani "Think Again: Sources of Islamist Terrorism," *Foreign Policy Online*, January 30, 2006. The author has also done a survey of 130 families who have lost sons to militancy in Afghanistan and Kashmir and has found that a very small fraction attended madaris and even fewer who were recruited in madaris.

^{xii} Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers." *The New Republic* (June 2002); Claude Berrebi, "Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians." Princeton University Industrial Relations Sections Working Paper #477 (2003); See Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terrorist Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrassah Scapegoat," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2006, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 117-125. All of these works suffer from at least one serious shortcoming: they ignore the fact that terrorists *impose* quality standards. Thus even if poorer and less educated persons are more likely to want to become terrorists, groups need not take them as long as there are fewer available terrorist positions than applicants. Thus their work tells us more about what organizations want in their operatives than it does about the characteristics of people who want to be terrorists.

^{xiii} Higher aptitude persons may be more likely to turn to terrorism when the economy is weak and jobs are in short supply. When the economy is good, "high-quality" persons generally have access to lucrative jobs relative to their "low-quality" counterparts, and the cost of leaving a good job in order to participate in a terrorist movement is relatively high. That helps explain why engineers and other technical persons with a history of underemployment get involved in terrorism. They are both available and desired by terrorist organizations, particularly during periods of economic stagnation and downturn. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "The Quality of Terror," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 2005, pp.

515–530 and Christine Fair and Husain Haqqani “Think Again: Sources of Islamist Terrorism,” *Foreign Policy Online*, January 30, 2006.

^{xiv} Because madaris education (Dars-e-Nizami) starts after completion of Mutavasatta, “10th-grade” madrassah students are older than their counterparts in Urdu and English-medium schools.

^{xv} Tariq Rahman, “Pluralism and Intolerance in Pakistani Society Attitudes of Pakistani Students Towards the Religious ‘Other’,” (PDF Version) Last revised October 30, 2003. Presented at conference on pluralism at the Agha Khan University-Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilization on October 25, 2003.

^{xvi} In addition to asking them specific questions about their points of view, he collected basic information about the student (age, class, gender) and teachers (gender, educational level, the subjects taught). From both faculty and student, he obtained parental employment information (e.g. rank, title, occupational status, salary, income, etc.) for both parents where applicable. Although few students actually provided this income information and most indicated that their mothers do not work. Thus, for students, this income information was not available.

^{xvii} Saleem H. Ali, Saleem H. Ali, “Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrassahs of Pakistan” (draft report, United States Institute of Peace, July 1, 2005).

^{xviii} For a discussion of these problems, see K.K. Aziz, *Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1998); A.H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim, *The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan-Urdu, English, Social Studies and Civics* (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2003); Iftikhar Ahmed, “Islam, Democracy and Citizenship Education: An Examination of the Social Studies Curriculum in Pakistan,” *Current Issues in Comparative Education*, Vol. 7, No. 1, December 15, 2004.

^{xix} This no doubt alludes to the fact that the current Minister of Education, Lt. Gen. (Retd) Javed Ashraf Qazi, is a former Director General of the ISI and Corps Commander (Multan) of the Pakistan Army.

^{xx} These will be discussed at length in Fair’s forthcoming work on Islamic education in Pakistan.

^{xxi} Unfortunately, there is no way to confirm or disconfirm this assertion at this point. However, Fair hopes to use the PIHS to explore whether or not this is the case.

^{xxii} In Pakistan (as in the United Kingdom), students begin specializing after they complete the 10th grade. Students in Pakistan first complete their FA (Fine Arts) and then their BA.

^{xxiii} Institute for Policy Studies Taskforce. *Pakistan: Religious Education Institutions. An Overview* (Islamabad: IPS, 2002).

^{xxiv} Notably, while most madaris are free for male students, female students typically pay for their education. Exceptionally needy students can apply for additional grant stipends (maybe a few hundred rupees per month).

^{xxv} See Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6, 2000, pp. 115-26 and Jessica Stern, “Meeting with the Muj,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 57, no. 01, January/February 2001 pp. 42-50.

^{xxvi} The International Crisis Group erroneously reported that 33 percent of Pakistan’s enrolled students attended madaris. Unfortunately, the ICG made a serious math error. The ICG used different data sources to estimate the market share of madaris: the total number of students attending madaris (obtained from Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the Minister for Religious Affairs) and the total number of enrolled students (obtained from the Ministry of Finance Economic Survey). According to Dr. Ghazi at the time of interview, there were between 1 and 1.7 million students at madaris. The ICG reported that the total enrollment for all students in mainstream schools was 1.9 Million. This would suggest that anywhere from 33% (1M/2.9M) to 47% (1.7M/3.6M) attend madaris. Unfortunately, the ICG made a simple—but serious mistake in copying data from the Ministry of Finance data. The total number of enrolled students was 19.2 Million—not 1.9 millions. (They simply dropped a figure in their calculation). Thus the ICG, once correcting their arithmetic mistake, actually found about a 5% (1M/20 M) to 8% (1.7M/20.9M) market share for madaris. The International Crisis Group. *Pakistan: Madrassahs, Extremism and the Military*,” ICG Asia Report 36 (Islamabad: ICG, 2002).